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Abstract / Résumé
The main objective of the new Bankruptcy Act (Bill C-22) is to promote the use of financial
reorganization in order to increase the chances of survival of businesses that are experiencing
financial difficulties and, as a consequence, to save jobs. Data from a sample of 417
commercial bankruptcies and 393 financial reorganizations are used to determine whether
or not this represents an improvement over the previous system and whether or not the
objective to increase the proportion of reorganizations will be met. Results from the statistical
and logit analyses suggest that (i) the new voting requirement will increase the number of
accepted proposals by 1.5 percentage points, (ii) the change in Crown priority will raise the
success and acceptance rate by 2.32 and 0.79 percent respectively and (iii) the changes
relating to stay of proceedings are expected to raise the use of holding proposals and thus
reduce the likelihood of acceptance of a proposal by unsecured creditors. Finally, that there
are several reasons to believe that encouraging firms that would otherwise have opted for
bankruptcy to reorganize will not be an efficiency gain for the Canadian economy.
Lobjectif principal poursuivi par la réforme à la Loi sur la faillite (Bill C-22) est de
promouvoir la réorganisation au détriment de la faillite pour les entreprises en difficultés
financières afin daccroître leurs chances de survie et ainsi de sauver des emplois. Les résultats
des analyses statistique et économétrique dune banque de données originales comprenant 417
dossiers de faillite commerciale et 393 dossiers de réorganisation commerciale concluent que
(i) lintroduction dun nouveau critère dacceptation dune proposition de réorganisation
augmentera la probabilité dacceptation de 1.5 points de pourcentage ; (ii) les changements
apportés à la priorité des créances du gouvernement entraîneront une augmentation de la
probabilité de succès et dacceptation dune proposition de lordre de 2.32 et 0.79 pour-cent
respectivement ; et (iii) les changements quant au gel des procédures des créanciers pourraient
se traduire dans une augmentation de proposition de type * provisoire + ce qui devrait diminuer
la probabilité dacceptation de la part des créanciers. Finalement, tout laisse croire que la
promotion de la réorganisation financière entraînera une augmentation des coûts de faillite au
Canada.
Key words: bankruptcy, reorganization, bankruptcy law
Mots clés : faillite, réorganisation, loi sur la faillite
See Bohémier (1992) and Fisher & Martel (1994b).1
See Bohémier (1992) for a detailed discussion of Bill C-22.2
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1 Introdcution
In December 1992, a series of amendments to the Canadian Bankruptcy Act came into
effect. A primary objective of these amendments is to promote the use of financial
reorganization in order to increase the chances of survival of businesses that are
experiencing financial difficulties and, as a consequence, to save jobs. To achieve this1
objective, the new Act provides for (i) a softening of the voting requirement necessary
for the approval of reorganization; (ii) an extension of the stay of proceedings to
secured creditors; and (iii) a change in the preferred status of a portion of the Crown
claims. In addition to these changes, the new Act introduces a new time structure for2
the reorganization procedure and provides greater protection for wage earners.
This paper has two aims. First, it considers the objective of promoting
financial reorganization from an efficiency perspective. One can argue that the role of
a bankruptcy law should not be to promote financial reorganization per se but rather
to act as a screening device to save insolvent but viable firms and to eliminate
non-viable firms. In addition, the objective to save jobs is often inconsistent with
improving the efficiency of the bankruptcy procedure. Second, it examines certain
individual measures introduced by Bill C-22 to determine their impact on the
reorganization process. This exercise is used to verify and extend the analysis
conducted by Fisher & Martel (1994b). These are first time studies on the topic of
bankruptcy and reorganization in Canada and a study which, among other things,
confirms the results of the only other study in the area is as important as the first
because there is very little basis for comparison.
The paper has the following structure. The next section provides some
background and historical information on the bankruptcy and reorganization
procedures in Canada and offers a short discussion on the relevance of a
reorganization procedure. Section 3 offers a summary description of the sample of
firms in bankruptcy and in financial reorganization in Canada while section 4 presents
a description of the logit analysis of the reorganization process in Canada. Section 5
tackles the issue of promoting financial reorganization in the context of improving the
efficiency of the Canadian bankruptcy system to act as a screening device. Finally,
section 6 discusses some of the most important modifications to the Bankruptcy Act.
Results from the statistical and logit analyses are used to evaluate whether or not these
changes will have an impact on the behaviour of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy.
See Bohemier 1992 and Martel 19913
The reader is referred to section 5 for a description of this procedure.4
Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992), Bebchuk (1988), Jackson (1986), Roe (1983) and White (1989)5
This is usually referred to the common pool problem.6
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2. Some Background on Bankruptcy and Reorganization
Before evaluating whether or not the changes to the Bankruptcy Act will meet their
objectives, it is worthwhile considering some historical background on the bankruptcy
procedures in Canada. The Canadian bankruptcy system offers two alternatives to3
insolvent firms: bankruptcy and reorganization. Although the origin of the modern
bankruptcy law, as we know it today, goes back to 1919, the Bankruptcy Act was
enacted in 1949. The bankruptcy procedure triggers an automatic stay of proceedings
to all unsecured creditors, provides for an orderly liquidation of the assets and a
distribution of the proceeds to unsecured creditors following the allocation scheme set
out in section 136 of the Act. A major concern with the bankruptcy procedure is that
it may result in the dismantlement of viable but insolvent firms. In such cases, the
value of the firms assets may be greater if held together than if sold piecemeal. To
minimize this possibility, the Bankruptcy Act provides for a reorganization procedure.
This procedure also imposes a stay of proceedings to unsecured creditors but the firm
continues operating under the protection of the court while negotiating new
arrangements with its unsecured creditors for the repayment of their claims. This
process allows an exchange of the pre bankruptcy claims for new reduced claims in
the reorganized firm.
There exists another means for financial reorganization in Canada. Debtors
which have outstanding secured or unsecured bonds (debentures) under a trust deed
can file a proposal under the Companies Creditors Arrangements Act (C.C.A.A.).4
The Act which was enacted in 1933, originally applied to all insolvent companies but
an amendment to the Act in 1952 restricted its use to debtors having outstanding
secured or unsecured bonds under a trust deed.
Although one can discuss the relevance of a specific bankruptcy procedure, there is
a general feeling that the state has an important role to play in the enforcement of
private contracts, especially in the area of insolvency. In a first-best world,5
bankruptcy laws would be irrelevant and individual debt contracts between debtors
and creditors would include specific provisions to cover for the possibility of default.
However, these contracts can be costly and difficult to implement since, on the one
hand, the debtors assets are likely to vary overtime and, on the other hand, the race
for the firms assets can be costly and lead to an inefficient allocation of resources in
the event of default.6
If there is a general agreement on the necessity of a legal bankruptcy system,
there is certainly unanimity with respect to the incentive problems created by the
Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) Bebchuck (1988), Baird & Jackson (1986), Bradley & Rosenzweig7
(1992), Fisher & Martel (1994a), Jackson (1986), Martel (1991) and White (1993, 1992).
Some academics have challenged the idea of having a reorganization procure in the bankruptcy law.8
See Aghion, Hart & More (1992), Baird & Jackson (1986), Bebchuk (1988), Jackson (1986),
Rasmussen (1992). This article does not enter that debate.
The sample is chosen to be representative of the regional distribution of bankruptcies and reorganizations9
over the years and the regional offices.
The reader is referred to Martel (1994b) for a detailed analysis of the data.10
All dollar figures are June 1993 Canadian dollars, deflated by the GDP deflator (Cansim series11
D20556).
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simultaneous existence of a bankruptcy and a reorganization procedure. As pointed7
out by White (1992), this type of legal structure can generate two types of errors: Type
I error whereby non-viable firms can avoid bankruptcy and can keep operating under
the protection of the court and Type II error whereby viable firms are eliminated.
Using Canadian data, Fisher & Martel (1994a) estimated that the overall occurrence
of filtering failure is between 14 and 39 percent.8
3. Descriptive Statistics on Bankruptcy and Reorganization
An essential element in examining the possible impact of the changes to the
Bankruptcy Act is the existence of micro-data on firms in bankruptcy and financial
reorganization. Prior to this study, there existed only one large scale and representative
sample of firms in financial reorganization in Canada. Fisher & Martel (1994c)
collected a sample of 338 firms in financial reorganization for the period 1978-1987
in order to examine the behaviour of creditors in reorganization. Their sample
originates from five regional offices in Canada; Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Calgary
and Vancouver.
This study uses a new sample of firms, which consists of 417 commercial
bankruptcies and 393 commercial reorganization proposals filed during the period
1977-1987 at the Montreal and the Toronto regional offices. Tables 1 to 3 provide9
descriptive statistics on firms in bankruptcy and financial reorganization.10
Table 1 shows that Canadian firms in bankruptcy are typically small firms
with an average value of assets and liabilities equal to $74,231 and $232,565
respectively. According to Table 2, nearly 85% of bankrupt firms have a value of11
assets lower than $100,000 and 98% of the firms have a value of assets lower than
$500,000. Less than 1% of all bankruptcy estates have assets larger than $1 million.
Ordinary claims represent, on average, 68% of the total liabilities of bankrupt firms.
Secured claims follow with an average ratio of 19% while the proportion of preferred
claims averages to about 12% of total liabilities. Bankruptcy affects a relatively small
number of creditors, the average being 24.
A proposal is successful when all the terms of the proposal are met by the debtor before the trustee is12
discharged.
There is a stage prior to the creditors vote, that is the firms choice between bankruptcy and13
reorganization. It is outside the scope of this study.
See Martel (1994a) for a full analysis of the results.14
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The average ratio of liabilities to assets of bankrupt firms is 72.2 (median of
8.1), which indicates that the financial health of these firms is extremely poor. Their
precarious financial situation is reflected in the payoff to creditors resulting from the
liquidation of the assets. The average payoff on preferred and ordinary claims is equal
to 23.2 and 2.5 cents on the dollar respectively and ordinary creditors receive a zero
payment in 77% of the cases examined. This confirms the view that bankruptcy
imposes substantial losses on creditors, in particular on ordinary creditors.
In comparison, Table 3 shows that firms in reorganization are significantly larger with
an average value of assets and liabilities of $2.45 and $2.98 million respectively and
an average of 110 creditors. Less than 24% of all firms in reorganization have a value
of assets lower than $100,000 and 28% of these firms have assets larger than $1
million. Ordinary, secured and preferred claims represent respectively about 60%,
32% and 6% of total liabilities at the time of reorganization. This suggests that firms
in reorganization rely more on secured financing than firms in bankruptcy. Firms in
reorganization are financially more healthy with a mean liabilities to assets ratio of
16.0 (with a median of 1.8). Ordinary creditors are offered, on average, 38.1 cents for
each dollar of claims. Firms typically reimburse their creditors using cash and deferred
payments, with 78% of the payments being made within one year of the courts
approval.
Almost 75% of the proposals are accepted by unsecured creditors. The time
period between filing and voting on a proposal is relatively short, with an average
period of 50 days. Of these accepted proposals, about 70% are successfully
completed. Therefore, we estimate that the probability of a firm to succeed in its12
reorganization attempt is 52.5%.
4. Logit Analysis of Reorganization
The reorganization procedure can be represented as a two-stage game. At stage one,
debtors submit a proposal to unsecured creditors for their approval. At stage two, an
accepted proposal can either be a success or a failure. A reduced form model is13
estimated to determine the impact of a number of modifications introduced by Bill
C-22 on the outcome of the reorganization process. Given the dichotomous nature14
of the dependent variables, the incidence equations are estimated using a two-step
See Maddala (1983) and Cannings, Montmarquette & Mahseredjian (1994).15
Estimation is performed using Shazam 7.0.16
Ratios, rather than absolute values, are used in order to reduce the sensitivity of the estimates to17
extreme values.
A large ordinary creditor is defined as a individual creditor having a claim in excess of 25% of total18
ordinary claims.
See Gunderson, Kervin & Reid (1986) for details.19
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logit model. First, a success incidence equation is estimated as a linear function of15
a number of exogenous variables. Second, the estimated parameters of the success
equation are used to calculate a predicted probability of success for each proposal in
the sample. Finally, an acceptance incidence equation is estimated as a function of
another set of independent variables and the predicted probability of success.16
Four policy variables are used to capture the effect of Bill C-22: the ratio of
Crown claims to total liabilities is used to estimate the impact of Crown priority on the
creditors decision in reorganization ; the number of days between filing and voting17
is used to determine the impact of the changes in the time structure in reorganization;
and two dummy variables are used to capture first the presence of a large ordinary
creditor and second whether or not the proposal is a holding proposal.18
Creditors decision in reorganization is largely determined by comparing the
expected payoff in reorganization to the expected payoff in bankruptcy. The expected
payoff in reorganization depends on four variables: (i) the payoff offered by the firm
in the reorganization proposal, (ii) the proportion of the total payoff being paid cash,
(iii) the length of the period for repayment, and (iv) the proposals perceived
probability of success by unsecured creditors. The expected payoff in bankruptcy is
defined as the ratio of assets, net of secured and preferred claims, to total ordinary
claims. The number of amendments is used as a proxy for the bargaining process in
reorganization and the change in the unemployment rate six months prior to the vote
is used to capture the expected state of the business climate. Finally dummy variables
are used to control for the region (Montreal vs. Toronto) for the type of business
(incorporated vs. unincorporated) and for the industries.
The results are reported in Table 4. Variables have been assigned to the
success and the acceptance incidence equations depending on the level at which they
are expected to have the largest direct impact. The logit coefficients measure the effect
of changes in the explanatory variables on the propensity for creditors to accept a
proposal. The effects of the explanatory variables on the probability for creditors to
accept a proposal are calculated at the mean of the data and displayed in the change
in probability column. For dummy variables, the change in probability measures the19
effects of a discrete changes.
Claims for source deductions have similar effects on the reorganization process.20
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5 More on the Impact of Bill C-22
This section uses the results of the statistical and the empirical analyses to examine the
impact of individual measures introduced by Bill C-22.
5.1 Crown claims
According to the Bankruptcy Act of 1949, federal and provincial Crown claims were
given preferred status and had to be paid in priority to all claims of ordinary creditors.
In a reorganization, Crown claims had typically to be paid in full upon ratification of
the proposal by the court. Bill C-22 provides for a change in the status of a portion of
Crown claims. Under the new Act, all Crown claims, with the exception of claims for
source deductions for Income Tax, Unemployment Insurance and Canada Pension
Plan contributions, rank as ordinary claims. In bankruptcy, claims for source
deductions rank as preferred claims and have priority over the claims of ordinary
creditors. In reorganization, a proposal has to provide for the full repayment of claims
for source deductions within six months of the plans approval by the court. The basic
idea behind these modifications is to give additional breathing room to firms in
financial reorganization.
The impact of the change to the Crown claims status can be evaluated from
two perspectives. First, the modification to the Crown priority has efficiency
implications with respect to the functioning of the reorganization process in Canada.
Martel (1991) argues that the full repayment of Crown claims upon the approval of the
plan hinders the chances of firms to get the approval of unsecured creditors and
reduces the likelihood of successful reorganization. Fisher & Martel (1994a,b) provide
evidence of this effect by showing that the presence of Crown claims significantly
reduces the probability of acceptance of a proposal. The results of the empirical
analysis supports these claims and provide new evidence for the negative effect of
Crown claims in reorganization. Table 4 shows that a one percent increase in the
proportion of Crown claims in total claims reduces the probability of success of a
proposal by 0.89 percent. Given that the a one percent change in the perceived
probability increases the probability of acceptance by 0.35 percent, a one percent
increase in the proportion of Crown claims also reduces the probability of acceptance
of a proposal by about 0.31 percent. According to the data, Crown claims represent,20
on average, 4.5% of total liabilities and source deduction claims represent 41.8% of
Crown claims in reorganization. Therefore the ratio of preferred Crown claims to
total liabilities is expected to decrease to 1.88% following the amendments. As a
result, the probability of success and of acceptance of a proposal should increase by
2.32 and 0.79 percent respectively.
These files contain information on both Crown and source deduction claims.21
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Second, the change to the status of Crown claims is expected to have
redistributive effects. The examination of 395 commercial bankruptcy files reveals that
the average value of Crown claims which would now rank as ordinary claims is equal
to $11,001. Since the average difference in the payoff rate on preferred and ordinary21
claims is equal to 16.9%, the net costs to the Crown of the change to its preferred
status is equal to $1,859 per commercial bankruptcy. Second, the analysis of 377
commercial proposals shows that the average value of Crown claims which would be
transferred in the ordinary claims category is equal to $36,478. Given an average
difference in payoff rates of 65.4 cents between preferred and ordinary claims, the net
costs to the Crown associated with the change in its preferred status is about $23,857
per commercial reorganization. Using 1993 as an example, where a total number of
12,527 commercial bankruptcies and 523 commercial proposals were filed in Canada,
the total costs to the government would have been approximately $35.8 million.
Although this number may appear to be large, one should remember this change in the
preferred status of Crown claims is to the benefits of ordinary creditors. Consequently,
this regime is more fair to all creditors and represents a clear improvement over the
previous situation.
Finally, this study wants to point out an inconsistency in the Act with respect
to the treatment, on the one hand, of the Crown and, on the other hand, of wage
claimants. From an efficiency perspective, creditors whose claims are unimpaired in
reorganization should have no right to decide upon a firms life. This is why wage
creditors no longer have the right to vote on a proposal unless part of their claims rank
as ordinary claims, in which case they vote only with respect to this part of their
claims. Ironically, the Crown retains its voting right for source deduction claims when
the Act specifies that a proposal cannot be ratified by the court unless it provides for
the full repayment of source deduction claims. This type of double standard is not only
inefficient but also unfair to all participants who do not have the legislative tools to
grant themselves such privileges.
5.2 Wage claims
Under the 1949 Bankruptcy Act, the claims for wages, salaries, commissions and
compensations, up to a maximum of $500 per worker for services rendered three
months prior to the bankruptcy ranked as preferred claims. Travelling salesmen were
entitled to an additional $300 in expenses. Any claims exceeding this limit ranked as
ordinary claims. The recent amendments to the Act raised the upper limit on preferred
wage claims to $2000 for services rendered during the six months preceding the
bankruptcy. Travelling salesmen are entitled to an additional $1000 in expenses. In
reorganization, a proposal has to provide for the immediate payment of preferred wage
As a counterpart, taking away the right of wage creditors to vote when their claims are unimpaired is22
an efficiency improvement over the previous regime.
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claims in order to be ratified by the court. As a counterpart, wage creditors are not
entitled to vote on the proposal, unless they also rank as ordinary creditors.
According to the data, approximately 10% of the commercial bankruptcies have some
positive wage claims. For these cases, the average value of total wage claims is $7,377
and the average value of wage claims per worker is $597. The wage claim per worker
exceeds $500 in 46% of the estates. Wage claims are more present in reorganization
with about 32% of the files having some positive wage claims. For these files, the
average value of total wage claims is $54,527. Approximately 90% of total wage
claims rank as preferred claims and 10% rank as ordinary claims. On an individual
basis, the average wage claim per worker is $1,396. The wage claim per worker
exceeds $500 in about 75% of the estates.
Intuitively, the changes to the treatment of wage claims in reorganization is
expected to reduce the likelihood of reorganization. First, increasing the amount of
wage claims to be paid up-front is expected to impose an additional burden on debtors.
Second, debtors are loosing an allied in their reorganization attempt since wage
earners, who no longer have the right to vote on a proposal, are likely to favour
reorganization over bankruptcy. However, it is yet impossible to determine22
empirically the impact of the increased protection of wage earners claims since the
new regime introduces a non-marginal increase in the amount of wage claims at the
time of reorganization and there is no way to control for the lost in the wage earners
right to vote.
5.3 Holding Proposals
A holding proposal is an interim document filed by an insolvent debtor requiring more
time for the preparation of a final proposal. Typically, creditors vote in favour of a
holding proposal with the expectation of having to vote on an amended proposal which
is to come within a short period of time. The rejection of a holding proposal
automatically entails bankruptcy.
According to Bohémier (1992), although holding proposals increase
uncertainty for unsecured creditors, they are still likely to approve the proposals
because their payoff in bankruptcy is typically very low. The author argues that the
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act with respect to the stay of proceedings confirms
the use of holding proposals by debtors. Under the new Act, an insolvent debtor can
file a notice of intention to file a proposal, which imposes a stay of proceedings to all
creditors, including secured creditors, for a maximum period of 30 days. After the
expiration of the 30 days, this period can be extended (in 45-day segments), with the
approval of the court, up to a maximum of five months. A greater use of holding
proposals can thus be expected under the new legal environment.
Taking into account the fact that 6.4% of the holding proposals are not confirmed by the court, mainly23
because of the non-filing of an amended proposal by the debtor, the acceptance-confirmation rate
decreases to 61.3%.
This figure overestimates the true proportion of commercial reorganization since it includes commercial proposals.
24
For the U.S., White (1984) reports that Chapter 11 cases represent, on average, 21% of the total25
Chapter 7 and 11 cases filed for the period 1980-1982 and this ratio appears to be increasing over the
years.
It is possible that the new regime attracts a number of firms which are reorganizing outside the26
Bankruptcy Act (workout arrangement). However, this phenomenon is difficult to evaluate given the
absence of data.
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The use of holding proposals has efficiency implications with respect to the
functioning of the reorganization process. These proposals introduce additional
uncertainty for unsecured creditors and they can be used by non-viable firms to delay
the bankruptcy procedure. Based on the data, holding proposals represent almost 24%
of the proposals in the sample and they have a lower acceptance rate, 67.7%, than
non-holding proposals, 77%. The results of the logit analysis presented in Table 423
confirms the reluctance of creditors towards holding proposals since they have 23%
less chances of being accepted than non-holding proposals. This suggests that, ceteris
paribus, a wider use of holding proposals will reduce the efficiency of the
reorganization process and will impose additional costs on the insolvency system in
Canada.
6 Promoting Financial Reorganization
The primary argument used to support of the promotion of financial reorganization is
that bankruptcy causes the disruption of the debtors activities and results in jobs
losses in the economy. Therefore, the bankruptcy law should facilitate reorganization
in order allow failing firms to continue operating and to save jobs. Historical data
shows that the legislator has not been very successful in encouraging reorganization
in Canada. For example, for the ten years prior to the new Act, reorganization cases
represent, on average, 6.2% of all commercial filings under the Bankruptcy Act.24
However, preliminary data suggests that the recent amendments has modify this trend
since reorganization cases represent 16% of all commercial filings in 1993.25
In order to evaluate whether or not the promotion of financial reorganization
is beneficial the Canadian economy, we have to examine the characteristics of firms
that are affected by the new regime. These firms are first, those which choose
reorganization over bankruptcy but which have their proposals turned down by
unsecured creditors, and second, those which would have opted for bankruptcy over
reorganization under the previous regime.26
This point was raised by Bohémier (1992), Section III. On the one hand, some debtors can file a27
proposal under the Companies Creditors Arrangements Act.
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First, for firms which have their proposals rejected by unsecured creditors,
the main modification likely to affect them relates to the softening in the voting
requirement. Under the previous regime, to be accepted, a proposal required the
affirmative vote of a majority of unsecured creditors voting, representing
three-quarters in value of the claims of those unsecured creditors voting. Under the
new Act, the value of claims criterion has been lowered to two-thirds in value of the
claims. The sample of 393 firms in financial reorganization indicates that 99 of the
393 proposals were rejected by unsecured creditors and that only 6 of these proposals
would have been accepted under the new voting rule. Thus, the softening of the voting
requirement is expected to increase the acceptance rate by 1.5 percentage points.
One can argue that the presence of a large creditor may hamper the reorganization
attempt of a viable firm by using its veto right on the acceptance of a proposal. The
data clearly suggests this possibility exists under the current system since the claim of
a single ordinary creditor is greater than 25% of total ordinary claims in 43% of the
reorganization estates examined. However, the results of the logit analysis reported in
Table 4 suggest that the presence of a large ordinary creditor does not have a
significant impact on the likelihood of acceptance of a proposal. Therefore, the
amendment with respect to the voting requirement is anticipated to have a small
impact on the likelihood of acceptance of a proposal.
The second category of firms which are affected by the changes to the Act are
those which would have chosen bankruptcy over reorganization prior to the changes
but which would now opt for reorganization. It was shown that bankrupt firms are
typically small firms with an extremely poor financial situation, the average liabilities
to assets ratio being 72.2 (with a median of 8.1). These firms are in the tail of the
distribution of financially distressed firms. Thus, there are serious doubts with respect
to the objective of encouraging their financial reorganization. After all, these firms
voluntarily chose bankruptcy when they could have opted for reorganization. In
addition, there are no particular reasons to anticipate that creditors would favour their
reorganization attempt or that the firms would be successful in their efforts.
Encouraging these firms to reorganize may simply result in an inefficient allocation of
resources and deadweight costs to the Canadian economy.
A second efficiency aspect of the reform which has to be examined is the
existence of a dual reorganization procedure for large Canadian corporations.27
(C.C.A.A.). On the other hand, they can also file a reorganization proposal under the
Bankruptcy Act. Prior to the amendments, the reorganization process was basically the
same under both Acts. Except for the treatment of secured creditors, both Acts
provided for the same treatment of Crown and wage claims and both had the same
Large corporations benefited from filing under the C.C.A.A. since it provides for the stay of proceedings28
of all creditors, including secured creditors and the inclusion of these creditors in a proposal. This advantage
of the C.C.A.A. over theBankruptcy Act disappeared with Bill C-22 which provides for a similar treatment
of secured creditors.
It is difficult to motivate the existence of the C.A.A.A when there exists a reorganization procedure29
accessible to all debtors in financial difficulties.
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voting rule for the acceptance of a proposal. However, since December 1992, the28
two systems differ on these aspects. Under the C.C.A.A., all Crown claims rank as
preferred claims while Bill C-22 gives a preferred status only to claims for source
deductions. The same is true for wage claims; the C.C.A.A. allows for a maximum of
$500 to rank as preferred claims for a period of three months prior to bankruptcy
while Bill C-22 allows for a protection of $2,000 for the six months preceding
bankruptcy. In addition, wage earners are entitled to vote on a proposal under the
C.C.A.A. but not under Bill C-22. Finally, under the C.C.A.A., to be accepted, a
proposal requires the approval of a majority of unsecured creditors representing
three-quarters of the claims of those unsecured creditors voting while Bill C-22 only
requires that the unsecured creditors supporting the proposal represent two-thirds of
the claims of unsecured creditors voting.
A comparison exercise suggests that Bill C-22 is more advantageous to
debtors with respect to the provisions relating to the Crown priority and the voting
requirement while the C.C.A.A. has an advantage with respect to the provisions
relating to the treatment of wage claims. Therefore, the existence of a third avenue for
a certain class of debtors is expected to accentuate the incentive problems in
bankruptcy and to give rise to strategic behaviour. As pointed out by Bohémier
(1992), there is a possibility that some firms may try to use both systems at the same
time, which will increase uncertainty on all creditors, render reorganization more
complex and more costly and increase the possibility of filtering failures. In this
context, there are no reasons to have two legal procedures for court-supervised
reorganization.29
7 Conclusion
Historically, the legislator has pursued two objectives with the reorganization
procedure in the Bankruptcy Act. First, it is used to give some breathing space to
financially distress firms who attempt to arrive at a new financial arrangement with
their creditors. Second, it is used as a means to save jobs. However, these two
objectives can often be inconsistent on efficiency grounds. The argument developed
in this study is that in its aim to promote financial reorganization, the new bankruptcy
regime will attract firms in the tail of the distribution of financially distress firms. For
instance, the data shows that the financial situation of firms likely to be attracted by
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this new system is extremely poor. In addition, the existence of two alternative
reorganization procedures is expected to worsen the incentive problems associated
with bankruptcy.
With respect to the individual measures introduced by Bill C-22, the study
concludes that (i) the change to the voting requirement will increase the proportion of
accepted proposals only marginally; (ii) the amendments relative to the protection of
wage earners is expected to impose an additional burden on firms in the short run and
take away a natural allied in reorganization, which is likely to reduce both the
likelihood of acceptance and of success of a proposal; (iii) the change in the status of
a portion of the Crown claims will improve the cash flow situation of firms in
reorganization and give them additional breathing room which will increase the
probability of success and of acceptance of a proposal; and iv) the new time structure
may increase the use of holding proposals which have a lower probability of
acceptance by unsecured creditors. These results support the claim of Fisher & Martel
(1994b) to the effect that the modifications to the Bankruptcy Act are likely to have a
modest impact on the reorganization procedure in Canada. However, the new
bankruptcy system is anticipated to be more costly.
14
8 References
Aghion P., O. Hart and J. Moore. The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform. Journal
of Law, Economics and Organizations, Vol. 8, 1992.
An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act and to Amend the Income Tax Act in
consequence thereof (Bill C-22), S.C. 1992, c. 27.
Baird, D. and T.H. Jackson; The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations.
Journal of Legal Studies, 127, 1986.
Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
Bebchuk, L. A.; A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations. Harvard Law
Review, 101, 1988, p. 775-804.
Bohémier, A.; Faillite et Insolvabilité, Time 1, ed. Thémis, Université de Montréal,
1992.
Bradley, M. and M. Rosenzweig; The Untenable Case for Chapter 11. The Yale
Law Journal, 101, p. 1043-1095, 1992.
Cannings, K., C. Montmarquette & S. Mahseredjian; Major Choices: Undergraduate
Concentrations and the Probability of Graduation. mimeo, Department of
Economics, Université de Montréal, August 1994, p. 1-24.
Fisher, T.C.G., and J. Martel; The Creditors Financial Reorganization Decision:
New Evidence from Canadian Data. Working Paper 9417, Department of
Economics, Université de Montréal, August 1994, p. 1-19. Revised &
Resubmit, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October 1994.
; Will the Bankruptcy Reforms Work? An Empirical Analysis of Financial
Reorganization in Canada. Canadian Public Policy, XX, No. 3, Sept.
1994, p. 265-277.
; Financial Reorganization in Canada. Canadian Business Economics, Vol. 2,
No. 2, Winter 1994, p. 54-66.
Gunderson, M., J. Kervin and F. Reid; Logit Estimates of Strike Incidence from
Canadian Contract Data. Journal of Labor Economics, 4, April 1986,
257-276.
Jackson, T.H.; The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986.
Martel, J.; A Model of Financial Reorganization., unpublished manuscript,
Department of Economics, University of Montreal, October 1994, p. 1-38.
; Commercial Bankruptcy and Financial Reorganization in Canada. Working
Paper 94c-2, CIRANO, September 1994, p. 1-38.
15
; Bankruptcy Law and the Canadian Experience: An Economic Appraisal.
Canadian Public Policy, XVII, No. 1, March 1991, pp. 52-63.
Rasmussen, R. K.; Debtors Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy.
Texas Law Review, Vol. 71, 1992, p. 51-121.
Roe, M. J.; Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization.
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 3 April 1983, p. 527-602.
White, M. J.; Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device. Working Paper No.
92-04, Department of Economics, Michigan University, March 1992, p.
1-19.
; The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, Journal of Economic Perspective, Vol.
3, No. 2, Spring 1989, p. 129-151.
; Bankruptcy, Liquidation and Reorganization, in Handbook of Modern
Finance, ed. Dennis Logue. Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1984.
The sample size is 417 files.a
The total assets, total liabilities, and the claims variables are reported in thousands of June 1993 Canadianb
dollars, deflated by the GDP deflator (Cansim series D20556).
Based on a sample of 41 estates with positive wage claims.c
The information on the payoff to ordinary and preferred creditors originate from the trustees Finald
Statement of Receipts and Disbursements. The variables are reported in percentages.
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for Firms in Bankruptcy in Canada.a
Variables Mean Median Standard
deviation
Min Max
Total assetsb 74.231 5.202 438.953 0.00 8 229.00
Total liabilities 232.565 87.882 673.606 4.41 9 377.20
Secured claims 72.761 0.000 336.146 0.00 5 883.70
Ordinary claims 130.117 50.134 311.881 0.00 3 256.66
Preferred claims 26.138 3.862 141.491 0.00 2 620.74
Crown claims 20.575 1.830 132.777 0.00 2 620.74
Source deductions claims 8.900 0.352 29.618 0.00 376.89
Total wage claimsc 7.377 1.264 15.961 0.07 79.40
Total wage claim per worker 0.597 0.611 0.351 0.07 1.59
Total number of creditors 24.432 15.000 45.448 1.00 701.00
Ratios
Liabilities to assets ratio 72.242 8.086 260.150 0.80 3 042.00
Secured claims / total assets 1.387 0.000 5.783 0.00 77.67
Crown claims / total claims 0.102 0.020 0.187 0.00 1.00
Crown claims / preferred claims 0.553 0.724 0.452 0.00 1.00
Source deductions / crown claims 0.405 0.084 0.450 0.00 1.00
Payoff variables
Payoff rate to ordinary creditorsd 2.533 0.000 9.534 0.00 100.00
Payoff rate to preferred creditors 23.182 0.000 37.198 0.00 100.00
TABLE 2
Distribution of Bankruptcy and Reorganization Estates by Assets.
Variables Distribution by Assets
Bankruptcy Reorganization
# 100 000 352 95
$100 000 < # $500 000 56 126
$500 000 < # $1 000 000 4 61
$1 000 000 < # $5 000 000 2 84
$5 000 000 < # $10 000 000 1 15
> $10 000 000 0 12
Total 415 393
The sample size is 393 proposals.e
The total assets, total liabilities, and the claims variables are reported in thousands of June 1993 Canadianf
dollars, deflated by the deflator (Cansim series D20556).
Based on a sample of 125 proposals with positive wage claims.g
Excludes a proposal from an incorporated firm with a ratio of 2953.h
The bankruptcy payoff, reorganization payoff, and the payments variables are reported in percentages.i
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TABLE 3
Summary Statistics for Firms in Reorganization in Canada.e
Variables Mean Median Standard
deviation
Min Max
Total assetsf 2 453.309 350.874 19 674.204 0.00 385 765.05
Total liabilities 2 981.584 783.890 15 875.596 22.00 301 750.68
Secured claims 1 610.431 201.254 12 247.279 0.00 237 437.86
Ordinary claims 1 008.831 438.754 2 024.847 11.70 25 659.25
Preferred claims 111.459 23.744 321.962 0.00 4 653.79
Crown claims 76.137 15.094 204.747 0.00 2 424.72
Source Deductions claims 39.164 5.919 134.480 0.00 1 952.88
Total wage claimsg 54.527 17.053 111.759 0.53 806.69
Total wage claim per worker 1.396 0.750 3.294 0.04 29.21
Total number of creditors 110.100 68.000 141.540 4.00 1 257.00
Ratios
Liabilities to assets ratio 16.005 1.767 211.130 0.44 4 100.00
Secured claims / total assetsh 0.781 0.539 3.372 0.00 65.00
Crown claims / total claims 0.045 0.021 0.067 0.00 0.50
Crown claims / preferred claims 0.593 0.694 0.384 0.00 1.00
Source deductions / crown claims 0.418 0.324 0.406 0.00 1.00
Payoff variables
Expected bankruptcy payoffi 37.237 30.332 36.454 0.00 100.00
Reorganization payoff 38.157 30.000 28.143 0.00 124.00
Proportion of payments in cash 7.230 0.000 23.234 0.00 100.00
Proportion of payments by installment 91.141 100.000 25.885 0.00 100.00
Proportion of payments in equity 1.629 0.000 12.378 0.00 100.00
Number of installments 3.050 2.000 4.121 0.00 36.00
Period for repayment (months) 14.011 9.000 16.027 0.00 120.00
% cash payments (< 1 month) 9.742 0.000 27.083 0.00 100.00
% payments within 3 months 50.224 0.000 42.634 0.00 100.00
% payments within 6 months 62.906 0.000 38.899 0.00 100.00
% payments within 12 months 78.364 0.000 31.544 0.00 100.00
Statistical significance is denoted by ** at the .05 level and * at the .10 level where the critical values arej
1.96 and 1.65 for a two-tailed test. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The sample size is 244 proposals and the success rate is 73.77 percent. The Cragg-Uhler R-Square =k
0.227.
The sample size is 384 proposals and the acceptance rate is 75.0 percent. The Cragg-Uhler R-Square =l
0.281.
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TABLE 4
Logit Estimates
Explanatory Variablesj Prob. Success Prob. Acceptance
Logit
coefficientk
Change in
probability
Logit
coefficientl
Change in
probability
Policy variables
Ratio of Crown claims to total claims -4.5953**
(2.3059)
-0.8892
Large ordinary creditor (dummy) 0.0962
(0.2723)
0.0176
Time between filing and voting (days) -0.0026
(0.0023)
0.0005
Holding -1.0185**
(0.4010)
-0.2300
Payoff variables
Expected payoff in liquidation -0.8681**
(0.4105)
-0.1628
Payoff in reorganization 0.6362
(0.5577)
0.1193
Perceived probability of success 1.8925**
(0.8753)
0.3548
Prop. of cash payments within 1 month 0.9784**
(0.4636)
0.1834
Prop. of payments within 6 months 1.3692**
(0.4524)
0.2649
Number of installments -0.0733**
(0.0365)
-0.0142
) unemployment rate (last 6 months) -0.3080**
(0.1313)
-0.0578
Other variables
Assets to liabilities ratio 0.8449*
(0.4831)
0.1635
Montreal -1.0037**
(0.4831)
-0.2301
Corporations -0.2051
(0.4643)
-0.0416
Number of amendments 2.1719**
(0.3966)
0.4072
Industry
Metallic minerals & metal products -0.9037
(0.6889)
-0.2051
Construction & related activities -0.4168
(0.4623)
-0.0881
Communications 1.2893
(1.1046)
0.1731
Accommodation, restaurants & recreation services -0.0987
(0.6769)
-0.0195
Consumer goods and services 0.1402
(0.4071)
0.0262
